

# Introduction

Our time is perhaps the time of an epidemic of things.

A kind of ‘thingly’ contamination of the present was brought about through the division of labour, the industrialisation of production, the processing of information, the specialisation of the knowledge of things, and above all the desubstantialisation of these things. In Western philosophical traditions, things were often ordered according to essences, substrata, qualities, predicates, *quidditas* and *quodditas*, being and beings. Precluding anything from being equally ‘something’, neither more nor less than any other thing, thus becomes a rather delicate task. We live in this world of things, where a cutting of acacia, a gene, a computer-generated image, a transplantable hand, a musical sample, a trademarked name, or a sexual service are comparable things. Some resist, considering themselves, thought, consciousness, sentient beings, personhood, or gods as exceptions to the flat system of interchangeable things. A waste of time and effort. For the more one excludes this or that from the world of things, the more and better one makes something of them, such that things have this terrifying structure: to subtract one of them is to add it in turn to the count.

This work was born from a feeling which it simultaneously attempts to uphold, illustrate, and rationally respond to: there are more and more things. It is increasingly difficult to comprehend them, to be supplementary to them, or to add oneself to oneself at each moment, in each place, amidst people, physical, natural, and artefactual objects, parts of objects, images, qualities, bundles of data, information, words, and ideas – in short, to admit this feeling without suffering from it. The goal of this work is to bring those who do not yet share this feeling to admit it, and to propose to those who already admit it a way of ridding oneself of it. This

involves the construction of a new model of the division of things – of things around us, of things in us, and of us among things.

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This treatise is for those of us who love things, but who struggle in the face of their accumulation. It aims to put a thought to the test: a thought *about things* rather than a thought *about our thought about things*. Whoever expects philosophy to teach them something about knowledge, consciousness, or individual and collective subjectivity more broadly, must be forewarned: they may be disappointed. Here we will return as little as possible to this way of thinking. However, this doesn't mean that we will abstain from it altogether. By entering into this work, the reader must agree not to immediately ask for its conditions – in other words, by asking: Where does an object come from? By whom and how? By what right, in what culture, and by what cognitive processes? If the model of things described in the following pages is valid, it ought to be retroactively applicable to any subject, consciousness, and condition of thinking, provided one has the patience to judge it at the end and not at the beginning.

Philosophies of intentionality, consciousness, language, and action that try to address our relations to things fail insofar as they begin by establishing a relation aimed at objectivity. The goal of objectivity is soon abandoned and never attained. For whoever believes that thought commences by aiming at the 'things themselves' always ends up eclipsing things, which were the ends, and siding with this movement of thought, knowledge, and action, which were merely the means.

By beginning this way, whoever bets on thinking primarily about our knowledge or consciousness of things produces an object of thought that they identify with a relation. Henceforth, on this view, each thing that will be an object of thought can only be recognised if it resolves itself within the relation. Just as Konrad Lorenz's geese are 'imprinted' – in the early ethological sense of the term – by the first living creature they see as a maternal object, philosophers who begin with human thought are imprinted by this method. What these philosophers primarily assume as an object of thought will forever remain the form of this object. This will be the imprint of what philosophy can and ought, if it is consistent, to accept consequently as being 'something'. It would be absurd to believe that philosophy could make its primary object conscious-

ness as ‘consciousness of’, and consequently to discover ‘things themselves’ other than as given by, for, and with the consciousness of these things, henceforth *imprinted* in it.

Therefore, it is in our best interest to initiate a way of thinking that attaches itself to things – rather than to this or that type of relation directed at things – in such a way that desire, will, mind, or subjectivity can be conceived as objects. A thought about things, marked at its birth by the imprint of objectivity, will no longer recognise anything except things. For this way of thinking, a subject is always an object, though that object may be a determined, modified, or intensified object.

The question is therefore: is it better to begin by thinking about our access, which will never have access to things, but only to our conditions of access, or to begin by thinking about things, which, if we do not want to cheat, obtains the thinghood in every possible mode of subjectivity?

The second solution deserves our approval for at least three reasons.

First, we have been incapable of doing otherwise, since we are caught reflecting on things from adolescence. Everything that proves to be a thing appears to us behind the mask of its thinghood. But this reason only holds a posteriori – and only because we have reluctantly entered a certain state of mind. This reason is singular.

Second, our time is plagued by the metaphysics of access. The twentieth century – to which this treatise in some way proposes to bid adieu – was a period of theorising our methodological *access* to things, rather than theorising about *things* as such. For example, our theories of methodological access talked about formal language and ordinary language; the phenomenology of consciousness and the phenomenology of perception; the opening of being; the structure of the unconscious and the structure of myths; normativity and processes of subjectivation; self-reflection and critical consciousness. But the pendulum was bound to swing the other way. This reason is historical. While writing this treatise, such a historical shift was not always acceptable, and will not endure, since we must also think about the conditions of givenness and of the representation of things. This historical reason is only a particular reason.

Third, we must understand that by initially thinking about things we are not prevented from conceiving of our thought,

language, and knowledge as things equal to things thought, said, and known. On the other hand, by initially thinking about our relations to things, we systematically fail to accomplish our original goal, the things themselves; this way of thinking loses its objective en route and falls short of its target. Its sole objective is to give a descriptive account of our methods of aiming at things through consciousness, language, representation, or action. But by thinking about things, we make no promises that we cannot keep, whereas a second-order thought about our thought about things, for example, promises an access to things that it ultimately denies the existence of. To the extent that philosophies of access exchange objects for conditions of their enunciation, things become estranged from their own composition as objects. This is a universal reason.

Personal, historical, and other arguments lead some to first consider that which is ‘something’, rather than the position, production, or formation of this ‘something’.

Does this treatise present a defence of ‘realism’, since it considers things rather than our access to these things? If one thinks that reality consists merely of possible, impossible, imaginary, or virtual kinds of things, then I think we can answer negatively. No preference is given here to any one special kind of thing, since each kind is neither better nor worse than another kind. *Real* things do not matter to us here. *Real things* matter to us – and, for this reason, other kinds of things as well.

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Our project finds common ground among those who are developing an ‘object-oriented metaphysics’, abandoning what Graham Harman calls ‘philosophies of access’,<sup>1</sup> and who are interested in a ‘flat ontology’ of things.

In Manuel DeLanda’s rereading of Gilles Deleuze’s philosophy, the idea of a ‘flat ontology’<sup>2</sup> was used to describe theories that do not order worldly entities hierarchically – either in accordance with the substantiality of entities, or based on transcendental principles – but that attribute an equal ontological dignity to each individuated thing. Like in some of Éric Chevillard’s novels, every difference between things – an atom, a dead person, a tree trunk’s roundness, a football team, the laws of gravitation, or a half of the word ‘word’ – systematically involves intensive differences, subject to variation.

In fact, we begin this treatise with an investigation of a flat ontology, or the possible ontology of a flat world, where things are devoid of any kind of intensity. The world explored in Book I is the world in which any thing, *sensu stricto*, is equivalent to another thing. Relativists will not breathe easy in this world. This book's central claim is that no classical determination – including the property of being non-contradictory, of being individuated, or of having identity or unity<sup>3</sup> – is contained in our concept of the most unrestricted, emptiest thing and in the most formal possibility of a 'thing'. We consider as inessential all that may characterise a thing until we have properly identified what defines it as a thing, and not as a *consistent* thing, *individual* thing, or *one* thing. We thus aim at neither the being of unconditioned things,<sup>4</sup> nor at that of undetermined things, but rather at the being of *de-determined* things.

Our approach goes to extremes to prove that it is possible to describe the non-trivial qualities of a world of things lacking all qualities. Once the possibility of a description of such a flat world of de-determined things is accepted, we must still prove its necessity, or at least its utility.

The goal of this de-determination is to have at one's disposal a cross-sectional plane of every container and every order which maps the topography of the physical, biological, animal, and human universe; artefacts; artworks; economic networks of production, exchange, and consumption; class, gender, and age differences.

This flat world must make use of necessary divisions, of a differential plane in relation to which the concrete relations of everything that has a determined content could be thought, questioned, and judged.

In short, our project attempts to generate a formal world of de-determined things. But it does not in the least aestheticise or consider this formal world as a refuge of ontological solitude independent of the modern and democratic accumulation of objects. We must understand that only the possibility of considering the flatness of things will enable us to locate ourselves among values, intensities, classes, order and chaos, the maelstrom of everything that inter-comprehends itself inside out [*s'entre-comprend sens dessus dessous*] – all that we comprehend and all that comprehends us. The cross-sectional plane of things without qualities is the final life preserver we cling to as we drown in the flood of

all that accumulates, submerses us, continually replenishes the horizons of knowledge and action, and moves us away from the world, from the totality of what is, which we dare not and know not how to imagine.

Since we have the impression that there are too many things (to see, know, or take into account), our thought, life, and actions become paralysed by the apprehension of objective complexity. This impression overflows with factors, networks, and relative positions which divide, intersect, overlap, and contradict each other, like so many injunctions that one cannot follow by simply remaining faithful or coherent (to whom? to what? one hardly knows any more).

The formal plane of thought enables us to cut short all episodic, experiential, or enacted accumulation through simplicity; its impoverished surface makes possible *this* or *that* as ‘something’, neither more nor less.

Unlike the ‘flat ontologies’ proposed thus far, we do not restrict ourselves to a plane of individuated and non-hierarchised entities, having recourse to the concepts of ‘interaction’ or ‘emergence’ to explain the appearance of totalities and organisational structures. We combine our *formal* ontology of equality with an *objective* ontology of inequality.

If this treatise presents an ontology of a flat world, its sole aim is to then propose an encyclopedia and topography of the universe and objects, of practical problems of division, and of the valuation of cosmological, biological, anthropological, cultural, artistic, social, historical, economic, and political domains. Far from concluding with a description of a formal world where differences between things have been reduced to zero, this book aims to assemble a description of a flat world of things that can match the antagonistic reconstruction – between universalism and relativism – of the magnitudes, values, depths, variations, and interests of present objects, accumulated endlessly, and contested by several methodological approaches.

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In hindsight, these contemporary theoretical problems first appeared to us chaotically and in isolation: the status of the ultimate components of matter and the ultimate form of the universe; the alternative between presentism and eternalism in ontologies of time; the emergence of life; the conflict between vitalism and

biochemical reductionism; evolutionary theory's division of life into species; and the difference between human and other animal species (dissolved by naturalism in the particular and strengthened by humanism in the universal). We can add to these contentious issues – the division of matter, life within matter, animality within life, and humanity within animality – the conflicts concerning the division of humanity's artworks, artefacts, and organisms into intensities, values (beautiful, true, and good), classes (of origin, of ideas, of social interests), genders (masculine and feminine), and ages. How does one divide a persistent thing or something becoming into different objects? How does one refrain from turning these objects into substances, making them compact, as if they existed in themselves? Conversely, how does one not dissolve them into pure eventuality,<sup>5</sup> potentiality, or becoming? Quite simply, how does one retain *things* – neither too closed on themselves, nor too transient?

We understand that the problem is always the same: that we divide cosmological space-time, the evolution of life, humans, and other animals; that we wonder what distinguishes artworks from other objects; that we classify things according to their value, gender,<sup>6</sup> or time. We must determine whether the concept of things is still possible – things which neither solidify into substances nor vanish into pure potentiality.

How should we proceed?

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The challenge of this book is to be neither determined by a positive content nor structured by an analytic or dialectical method.

The price to pay for this approach is that it may be judged to be naïve, simple, and fallible, built upon no positive knowledge, adhering to neither humanity nor society, neither history nor nature. The argument does not arrange the universe of all things according to an eminent object which would comprehend them all together. Instead, it seeks its own architecture. It does not put forward a satisfactory explanation, a narrative where *everything* organises itself humanly, naturally, socially, historically, and so on. Here, in the last instance, things will never lie in a household altar of this kind – without actually being an entirely vacuous narrative.

Articulated by no logic, admitting neither the law of non-contradiction nor the a priori conditions of rationality, our

argument may also risk seeming to an analytic philosopher, unconscious, inconsistent, without infrastructure, or as refusing to admit what is implicitly its own infrastructure.

Lastly, we refuse to dialectically arrange contradictions. For a dialectician, our theory may appear to go nowhere, to sink into relativism, to make everything and anything possible, to prove to be inconsistent and, worst of all, flat, since it does not hierarchise things formally.

In the last analysis, our theoretical compass will be the conviction that *no thing is reducible to nothing*, which resists both analysis and dialectic. Such a proposition means both that no thing can be absolutely reduced to nothingness – because that thing is dead, past, false, imaginary, nonexistent, or contradictory, for example – and that no thing is absolutely reducible to any other thing. Every analytic reduces the possibility of being something to some logical, rational, or pragmatic conditions. Every dialectic reduces the possibility of being something to its mediation by another thing. Instead, we demonstrate our commitment to that solitary something in each thing that can never be reduced to anything else. This irreducibility is the ‘chance’ of each thing, and the ground for dismissing both analytic and dialectical ways of thinking. We reject ways of thinking that reduce things exclusively to natural, social, or historical things.

We are situated, and hope to situate the reader, in light of this single idea: we must be aware that no thinkable thing can be reduced to nothing, and that thought itself cannot reduce anything to nothing.

This book tries to retain the ontological *chance* of each thing by considering each disposition of things as a direction of the circulation of being, justifiable so long as it is neither impossible nor makes itself impossible.


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In order to clarify this idea, we represent possible distribution channels of being.

The first model consists in conceiving of being as circulating from things which do not exist by themselves: predicates and accidents. Let us allow the quality of an entity to be represented by an arrow projecting being, which the quality has, onto the being of an entity that the quality describes. If I aim at the being of some redness, the texture of denim, and some cut or pattern in

the form of an hourglass, I can imagine three arrows carrying the being of redness, the being of denim, and the being of the form of an hourglass towards a fourth arrow: a dress which is red, denim, and in the form of an hourglass. And yet the dress is not predicated on anything, while the redness, denim, or form of an hourglass are predicated on the dress. The dress directs the circulation of being into itself, into its *self*. At the end of its flight, the arrow of the dress aims at nothing other than itself. In this substantial model of the distribution of being, the being of some secondary entities flows towards the being of primary entities which flows in a closed channel. Being's channel is blocked by the in-itself, which acts as a necessary buffer against its circulation. A thing, in the strict sense, is thus constituted by the distribution channel of a self-sustaining being, and of beings sustained by this primary being. These qualities are like tributaries of a river – substance – flowing towards its own ocean and its own source. In this essentially ancient and classical way of dividing things – from Plato and Aristotle to Kant and Hegel, and implicit in Confucianism and Samkhya – there is clearly a hierarchisation between what is carried towards something other than itself and this other thing which serves as its ontological support, supporting its proper being.

The second model consists not in distributing being substantially, but vectorially. One thus conceives of trajectories of being, identified with events, facts, powers, intensities, or intentionality.




**Figure 1:** The substantial channel of being

These vectors of being are primary. They carry, support, and displace being, but without ever obtaining an end point or objective consistency. In such a representation, what is in the world is not identity but difference, trajectory, becoming, a continuous projection of being which never leads to a compact being, closed upon itself. There is no in-itself. Being is never like the flight of a boomerang. Nothing is self-contained or sealed. The ontological plane is open and extends through flows, forces, and becomings. To account for the apparent existence of things, of identifiable and re-identifiable stable entities, this model views the possibility of determining figures at the intersection of different trajectories. These figures are sealed, like the sides of a triangle made of plumes of transient smoke emitted from three aeroplanes scanning the sky. An observer may have the impression of perceiving a triangle in the sky, a determined figure inscribed in the conjunction of three different events or trajectories. In this essentially contemporary vectorial model (found in certain Nahua philosophies of Mexico, Nietzsche, Bergson, and evolutionary theory), things are considered as secondary effects, constructions, or illusions at the intersection of several events or vectors of being.

Every epistemic domain – from cosmology to sociology (which divide spatio-temporal events or individuals into domains) and from biology to psychology (which define species within evolving processes or subjects among effects, actions, and reactions) – tends to secretly rely on models of the circulation of material, social, biological, or psychological being.

But every epistemic domain must not and cannot have anything *except* substantial ontologies and vectorial ontologies.



**Figure 2:** The vectorial channel of being


Each division of things is accompanied by the development of some distribution channel of being. And if we want to divide things in a flat world in order to section off the accumulation of objects (which prevents us from being and from comprehending the world), we must find a non-substantial and non-vectorial way of allowing the being of things to circulate. Substantiality tends to compact being in the final stage of its process, overdetermining self-saturated things or things in themselves. The pure eventuality of the vectors of being tends to dissolve and disseminate being, and transforms things into effects, illusions, or secondary realities. Our concept of a thing fits neither the first nor the second model. The first produces a thing which is too much of a thing, which is 'compact', while the second generates a thing which is not enough of a thing, which is only a construction or ephemeral projection. Our aim is the following: to conceive of a model that is neither too strong nor too weak, and to represent things that are really in the world without being in themselves.

The only solution consists in constructing the following trajectory: being enters into a loop wherein being is not projected in itself, but cast outside itself. In our model, an arrow points inside to a circle – a thing – and then from this circle a second arrow points outside.

Being comes inside a thing and being goes outside it. A thing is nothing other than the *difference* between being-inside [*l'être entré*] and being-outside [*l'être sorti*]. Accordingly, the channel of being is never blocked. Inside a thing, a thing is never itself. A thing is not in itself, but outside itself. Nonetheless, being is not eventually 'pollinated' by vectors, but has an objective end-point. Things correspond to the circle indicating the gap, difference, and inadequacy between the entering arrow and the exiting arrow, and are inscribed or *imprinted* in the world.

To reinscribe things in the world is to situate them outside themselves (as substances) and outside us (as subjects). It is to arrange them outside themselves (their self and ourselves) in the world. The price to pay for this arrangement is a circulation of being that systematically distinguishes two senses [*sens*] of things: *that which is in a thing* and *that in which a thing is*, or that which it comprehends and that which comprehends it.<sup>7</sup>

Take, for example, a block of black slate, a random rectangular sample taken from a site of continental collision. Few people will deny that this block is a thing. One can of course point out that it



**Figure 3:** The thingly channel of being

is necessary to have an active subjectivity to divide or distinguish this block of matter lying on the ground of dusty soil, in order to perceive it as such. But this slice of black slate possesses certain qualities of cohesion and of solidity that allow one to dissociate it from its environment, handle it, transport it, and consider it quite simply as ‘something’. What is it composed of? It contains quartz, clay-like minerals, mica, some traces of feldspar. And all these components themselves have a certain atomic structure. But in a wider sense, they also enter into the constitution of the rock as ‘thing’: its rectangular form, the irregularities of its surface, the porphyroblasts coated with pyrite, its sombre color, its delicate texture, its weight, its fragility, and all the primary or secondary qualities by which we can recognise the black slate.

We say that this is *all that is in this thing*, all paths of being that lead to the constitution of this black slate in my hand.

Yet, *that in which this slate is* can never be inferred from *everything that is in this slate*. From everything which composes it, I will not obtain the slate’s location in the world, the relations in which it inscribes itself, the fact that it is now in my hand, the function of a weapon that it can exercise if someone attacks me, its place in the landscape or in the series of slate pieces scattered alongside this valley. That which it is, this unique thing which exists in the world, and I hold in my hand, is outside itself. The slate can in fact enter into the composition of the side of a mountain, a roof, or a

collection of rocks. As a whole, it then becomes a part of another thing, and it is no longer a question of *that which is in the slate*, but of *that in which this slate is*.

A number of things are in this black slate. The black slate on its own can enter into the composition of a number of other things. Therefore, the black slate is not in itself. It is not a substance on which various qualities are predicated – for example, its weight or its colour. No more is it an ephemeral entity, not existing in itself, constructed by my thought, senses, or action, from events or becomings (some variation in the matter's density, some effects of geological transformation, a trajectory of luminous rays). No, the black slate is a relation, inscribed in the world, between the being that enters the world and the being that goes outside it, and that enters in turn into another thing (into the soil, landscape, classes of other objects, my perception, or the world in general).

A thing is nothing other than the difference between *that which is in this thing* and *that in which this thing is*. Unless one guarantees this double sense, there are no thinkable things. Every reductionist who claims to deduce that which this or that thing is from that which composes this or that thing only succeeds in dissolving the very thing that they claim to account for. We attempt to accomplish the exact opposite of this: to guarantee things as invaluable differences embedded in the distribution channels of being of the world. To complete our task, we set out to discover the meaning which circulates among things, between that which composes them and that which they compose, inside or outside us, with or without us.

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This meaning that we call for, and that thought seeks, is not salvation. It is not the possibility of holding onto the essential, necessary, or genuine self after the end of life, or in our damaged social existence.

Some ways of thinking seek salvation. Here we seek to redeem nothing: not the soul, not personhood, not the body, not thought, not a community, not the proletariat. A thing among things, this treatise attempts to save neither me nor you; between things there is no salvation whatsoever.

The meaning we seek is not reducible to a mere signification, a language game, a body of practices, or a normative system. Whoever calls for a semiotic meaning of things or a return to the

*description* of their signification, to the ways in which we name or make use of things, or to our linguistic, social, or cultural practices will be disappointed. The promise of thought is not kept. I seek a meaning of things outside us, and I have returned to what takes place between us.

Salvation is the hope of situating oneself outside things (escaping annihilation, death, oblivion, inauthenticity, alienation, reification). Signification is the disappointment of never managing to abstract things from the relations that we maintain with them. Salvation situates us outside of things, while signification precludes things from being situated outside of us.

I do not wish for the salvation of my soul, my body, human beings, my ideas, or my individuality. I do not ask for the (linguistic, cultural, historic) signification of things – our way of referring ourselves to them, of constructing their significance, of using them, of exchanging them, of making them significant among us, for us, and by us. No, I simply search for a meaning of things, whether this is the meaning of me, of you, or of a piece of black slate.

In truth, this meaning – neither completely existential nor completely semiotic – is simply the possibility of passing from one thing to the other. It is the possibility and necessity of never being reduced to a thing that would be nothing else, that would be in nothing else, and that would not exist in and by itself – whether one calls that matter, nature, history, society, God, or an individual. As if one could reduce the black slate to being nothing but a material thing or a natural thing or a social thing. As if one could then consider matter, nature, or society as things outside appearances, absolute, remaining in themselves. This ghost of ‘compactness’, which will be the adversary of our whole adventure of thought, will only disappear on one condition: for each thing to make sense, it must have *two* senses. Nature or history as things contain many things (first sense), but they are contained by things other than themselves (second sense).

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If one wants to formulate this undertaking in a single equation, it would be this: how do we obtain universality and maintain the sense of relativity at the same time? The price of this twofold commitment both to universalism and to the sense of relativity will be the abandonment of ecstatic becoming and of self-saturated things. In Book I, we must conceive of things emptied of them-

selves, without identity and de-determined. In Book II, we must conceive of things replenishing each other and ordered encyclopedically. Therefore we must learn to see double, formally and objectively, so that thought advances through a formal step and an objective step.

The structure of the treatise shows us how we can consider these two steps. Setting aside the Coda, which marks the collapse of the whole, the entire treatise is carried out in two books, which complement and respond to each other in sixteen chapters. The first book's formal system demands some confidence from the reader, for it is deliberately devoid of references or citations from the history of philosophy, although it tackles classical questions (for example, the One, the Whole, Being). This book combines affirmative and numbered propositions and full-page argumentation alongside descriptions of the flat world. The second book's objective system is based on first book's forms, but it puts them to the test in connection with various determined and ordered objects – structures of the universe, an individual's death, definitions of life, animality, art, and the economy – by adopting a more discursive style, strengthened by explicit and much more common references.

Whether your way of spontaneously relating to things is *formal* or *objective*, you are free to read this treatise in one way or the other to give meaning to the progress of philosophy.

## Notes

1. In other words, ways of thinking that recognise 'that philosophy can be concerned only with our access to things' (Graham Harman, *Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects*, p. 123). Quentin Meillassoux prefers to speak of 'correlationism' to describe the theoretical primacy accorded to the *relation* between thought (or any other directed position: consciousness, perception, intuition, Merleau-Pontian 'flesh') and its correlate, to the detriment of each side of the terms in relation. See Quentin Meillassoux, *After Finitude*.
2. Manuel DeLanda, *Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy*, p. 47.
3. The entire treatise strives to refute W. V. O. Quine's famous slogan, 'no entity without identity' (W. V. O. Quine, *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays*, p. 23). It also seeks to refute Leibniz's claim in his letter to Arnauld that 'what is not truly *one* being is not truly *one being* either' (G. W. Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays*, p. 86). The aim

of this book is to actively demonstrate, through the construction of a coherent model, that there can and must be something less determined than such an *identifiable* entity or than being *one*: each ‘thing’ as it is ‘alone in the world’, and not comparable or compared with other things. Therefore, we maintain that solitude is less than unity and identity, and that it does not imply acceptance (any more than refusal) of the law of non-contradiction.

4. In the German idealist tradition – for example, early Schelling – to be unconditioned is to be what cannot be transformed into a thing. The thing (*das Ding*) is conditioned (*be-dingt*) by something other than itself.
5. [Translators’ note: We translate the French neologisms ‘*évènementialité*’ and ‘*évènemential*’ as ‘eventuality’ and ‘eventual’ (comparable to ‘substantiality’ and ‘substantial’), to be distinguished from ‘eventuality’ and ‘eventual’. They should be understood in the sense of ‘pertaining to events’ rather than in the sense of contingent, possible, or probable future events or outcomes.]
6. [Translators’ note: The French ‘*genre*’ may be translated in a variety of ways, depending on the context: (1) as ‘genus’, often in mathematical, scientific, or philosophical contexts; (2) as ‘gender’, in both the grammatical sense and in the sense of the relations between the masculinity and femininity of persons; (3) or as ‘genre’, in aesthetics, arts, and letters. The occurrences of ‘*générique*’ are translated most often as ‘gendered’, though occasionally as ‘generic’.]
7. [Translators’ note: We have rendered the French ‘*sens*’ most often as ‘sense’, but also in some cases as ‘meaning’, and rarely as ‘direction’. Readers should also note that Garcia distinguishes ‘*sens*’ from ‘*signification*’. Garcia’s correspondence with us has undoubtedly helped to clarify these matters, and we have tried to maintain consistency as much as possible at Garcia’s request.]